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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

ADOPTION-FAILURE TO GRANT PUTATIVE FATHERS AN ABSOLUTE
VETO POWER OVER ADOPTION IS NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OR
EQUAL PROTECTION.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978).

On March 24, 1976, Randall Walcott filed a petition with the
Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, to adopt the twelve year old
illegitimate child of his wife of nine years. Under Georgia law, the
adoption of an illegitimate child required the consent of the mother but
not that of the putative father. 1 The child's natural father, Leon Quilloin,
filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking visitation rights, a petition for
legitimation, and an objection to the adoption. The petition for legitimation was denied, depriving the natural father of standing to object to the
adoption. 2 He appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court which affirmed the
trial court's findings. 3 Quilloin subsequently appealed to the United
States Supreme Court on the basis that the state adoption statutes, as
applied to him, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. 4 On January 10, 1978, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court.

In Quilloin v. Walcott,5 the Court answered the unresolved question
of an earlier decision, Stanley v. Ilinois,6 regarding "the degree of
protection a State must afford to the rights of an unwed father in a
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973) (repealed). This provision was revised to
include a requirement of notice to the putative father. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-406 (Supp.
1977). It should be noted that the Georgia adoption statutes have been comprehensively
revised. See note 16 infra.
2. The father of an illegitimate child could legitimate the child by petition under GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973); however, the denial of the petition rendered operative the
provisions of GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973). See GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973).
3. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230,232 S.E.2d 246(1977), aff'd, 98S. Ct. 549(1978).
4. The appellant also challenged the statutory provision which gave the mother of an
illegitimate child the power to exercise all parental authority over that child. GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-203 (1973).
5. 98 S. Ct. 549 (1978).
6. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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. 7.in which the countervailing interests [of the state] are more

substantial."
Stanley was an attack on an Illinois statute which failed to include
an unwed father in the definition of a parent, thus subjecting his custody
of his illegitimate children to termination without a hearing on his fitness
as a parent.' In overruling the state decision, the Court found that the
effect of the statute was to presume that unwed fathers were unfit parents
as a matter of law.9 The Court determined that protection of the family
unit constituted a fundamental right' 0 and that where an existing family
unit was disrupted,I the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
precluded the advancement of administrative convenience 12 as a justification for the statute's lack of procedural safeguards.' 3 Having found this
familial right to be constitutionally protected, the Court summarily held
that the denial of a hearing on the parental fitness of an unwed father,
while such hearings were granted to other parents, violated the equal
protection clause. 14 Left undecided was the question of at what point a
compelling state interest5 would permit a statutory distinction between
wed and unwed fathers.'
As in Stanley, the basis of the natural father's appeal in Quilloin
7. 98 S. Ct. at 551.
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (repealed) provided that
"parent" meant the mother or father of a legitimate child, or the natural mother of a child
born out of wedlock. The result was that a child living with his natural, unwed father fell
within the statutory definition of a dependent minor, subject to being made a ward of the
state. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972), 704-8 (Smith-Hurd 1972)
(repealed). The definition of parent now appears in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978), and includes both parents of a child born out of wedlock.
Section 704-8 now appears as ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)
containing no major changes.

9. No such presumption arose under the Georgia statutes, as an unwed father could
gain the power to veto an adoption by legitimation, during which proceeding he could
enter evidence of his parental fitness. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973). The impact of this

distinction between the statutes was to remove from the Court in Quilloin consideration of
the equal protection claim of an irrebuttable presumption, i.e., the making of a statutory
classification which is not universally and necessarily true. See notes 30-44 infra and
accompanying text.
10. 405 U.S. at 651.
11. The fact findings in Stanley showed that the father had lived with the children and
their mother prior to the death of the mother and had supported the children during that
time. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which rejected the claim that

administrative convenience could justify gender-based distinctions in inheritance statutes.
But see, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), which upheld a Louisiana statute
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children for the purposes of inheritance.
13. 405 U.S. at 657-58.

14. 405 U.S. at 658.
15. See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
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was that the state statutes16 which treated him differently than legitimate
parents violated both the due process and the equal protection clauses. He
alleged that the state's application of the "best interest of the child"
standard, 17 rather than a finding of parental unfitness, inadequately
protected his parental interest. 18 He further alleged that absent a finding
of unfitness, the state had violated equal protection requirements by

denying him the same absolute veto power over the adoption granted to
legitimate parents. 19

The method of analysis of a due process attack is determined by the
type of right the offending statute purports to limit.20 The Stanley court
resolved that when the right involves the sanctity of the parent-child
relationship, the individual's interest will "come to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements."21 Similarly, Quil16. Georgia's adoption statutes were comprehensively revised, effective January 1,
1978. The Court in Quilloin noted that these revisions left the substance of the statutes,
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-203 (1973), 74-403(3) (1973) (repealed), intact; therefore, the appellant would have received the same rights under the new provisions as he actually was
granted by the trial court. 98 S. Ct. at 553 n.12.
For an analysis of the changes instituted by the recent revision, see Outman, Georgia's New Adoption Laws, 13 GA. ST. B.J. 172 (1977).
17. Courts have struggled with the applicability of the "fitness" and "best interest of
the child" tests in child custody proceedings since the days of feudal England. For a
discussion of both tests and their development, suggesting that the "fitness" test is more
applicable in a custody suit between parent and nonparent, while the "best interest" test
should be applied in contests between parents, see Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 615 (1964). For the view that the tests are not so easily distinguished
and that the ultimate issue in custody proceedings should always be the child's best
interest, see Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1973).
18. The Court noted that the legitimation proceeding before the trial court afforded
the appellant the opportunity to be heard on all issues, including parental fitness. 98 S. Ct.
at 552. This difference from Stanley, where unfitness was presumed by the state, removed
from Quilloin the consideration of an equal protection challenge based on an irrebuttable
presumption. See note 9 supra.
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1973) (repealed). It should be noted here that a major
issue in Stanley not raised by this appellant was the lack of notice of the custody
termination. For a comprehensive view of the notice problem of Stanley, as applied to
adoptions of illegitimate children, see Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father,59 VA. L. REV. 517 (1973).
20. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), which took a deferential view
toward legislative power to regulate economic rights. But see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which employed a much more severe scrutiny in upholding a
due process challenge to a statute which infringed on marital rights of contraception.
The basic question is the source and identity of the rights which invoke this closer
judicial examination of a statute. For a discussion of the constitutional sources of
noneconomic rights and due process, see Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut:The Justices and
Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law", 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680 (1967).
21. 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting from Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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loin found it well established that "freedom of personal choice in matters
of

.

.

family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "22
Once having defined a right as fundamental or essential,23 the Court
is supposedly still free to uphold a statutory limitation of that right against
a due process challenge provided that the state has a compelling interest
for the regulation and the legislative means are not overly broad.24 While
Stanley found such a state interest in the nurturing of a child's family
ties, the Court rejected the means which severed those ties without a
determination of the fitness of the parent in question. Since the purpose
of the state was to preserve the home unit, unless it was an unsuitable
environment for the child, a law which disrupted that home without
finding the parent unfit did not bear a rational relationship to that
purpose.

The rationale of Quilloin never explicitly identifies the state interest
sufficiently compelling that neither challenged statute was violative of
due process.26 Since the Court based its holding on the position of the
unwed father relative to the family unit,27 and in light of the articulations
of Stanley,28 it seems clear that the preservation of the family unit has
been accepted as a valid means of promoting the child's best interest.
22. 98 S. Ct. at 555 (quoting from Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-40 (1974)).
23. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (which nonetheless invalidated
the statute).
25. 405 U.S. at 652-53.
26. The source of the state's power to enact legislation governing the rights of its
citizens is its general police power which the Court has declined to delineate other than by
imposition of a requirement of reasonableness. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962). The only enunciation by the Court in Quilloin as to the purpose for which
this power has been exercised is "to give full recognition to a family unit already in
existence." 98 S. Ct. at 555.
27. 98 S.Ct. at 555. This relation of the father to the family unit is the key distinction
between Stanley and Quilloin. As the father's status as an actual family member, supportive of the child's needs, becomes less clear, the interest of the state in promoting the
child's well-being through protection of the actual family unit increases.
28. The statutory means involved in Stanley did not concern the question of adoption.
See note 8 supra and accompanying text. However, the purpose espoused by the state in
both Stanley and Quilloin was the well-being of the child. The effect of Stanley on
adoption of illegitimate children and the problems it has raised, such as identification of
unknown putative fathers, are discussed in Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"--Rights
for Fathers of Illegitimate Children, 61 ILL. B.J. 350 (1973). For an examination of the
effect of Stanley on the adoption statutes of three states, Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan, see Freeman, Remodeling Adoption Statutes After Stanley v. Illinois, 15 J. FAM. L.
385 (1976). For an extensive review of the procedural ramifications of Stanley in custody
suits, see Note, The Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedingsfor Illegitimate
Children:ProceduralParityfor PutativeFathers?,3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHAMOE 31
(1973).
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Seen in this respect, the effect of the Georgia statutes as applied to the
appellant was to prevent the disruption of the de facto family unit. Where
the child had never lived with his natural father, but had resided for nine
years with his mother and step-father, the Court held that due process
required only a determination that denial of legitimation and approval of
the adoption served the "best interest of the child.' '29 Thus, while
Stanley held that the fitness of a parent could not be made immaterial to a
statutory abridgement of the family relationship, Quilloin allows parental
fitness to be considered as one of many factors affecting the child's best
interest. To do otherwise would render parental fitness an unassailable
fortress from which an unwed parent could prevent the child from ever
benefitting from a permanent and stable home life.
Assuming that his parental rights had received due process through
the legitimation proceeding, the appellant contended further that his
power to veto the adoption should be measured by the same standard
applied to married fathers, in order to satisfy the requirements of equal
protection.3" As noted previously, 31 the Court in Stanley, having found a
fundamental right in the parent-child relationship, concluded that affording a hearing on fitness to married parents, but not to an unwed parent,
prior to a disturbance of that relationship was an unquestionable denial of
equal protection. 32 However, the briefly stated support for this conclusion hinders useful comparison of methods of analysis used by the Court
in Stanley and Quilloin.
Looking instead to traditional notions of equal protection, the underlying concept is that equal protection bars statutory distinctions between
persons similarly situated under given conditions. 33 The analytical juncture, as with due process problems, is the identification of the individual
interest as an economic right or a personal liberty.3 4 The significance of
29. 98 S. Ct. at 555.
30. Since GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1)-(2) (1973) (repealed) gave married parents an
absolute veto power over adoption of their children absent a voluntary surrender of rights,
abandonment, willful failure to provide for the child, or a termination of parental rights,
appellant argued that the provision giving the mother of an illegitimate child the sole
exercise of parental power discriminated against putative fathers to an extent prohibited
by Stanley.
31. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
32. 405 U.S. at 658.
33. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), which held that such
distinctions would be judged in light of the nature of the classification, the individual
liberty affected, and the state interest which the classification purports to advance.
34. With respect to due process challenges, see note 20 supra and accompanying text,
an unavoidable problem area will be the identification of the right involved, its constitutional source, and the degree of protection to be granted. In his now famous footnote to
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937), Justice Stone suggested that
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this classification of rights is the impact the nature of the right protected
has upon judicial willingness to gainsay the legislature. Where the right
impinged is economic, the Court has traditionally deferred to a legislative
judgment concerning the appropriateness of the statute to the state's
purpose. 35 On the other hand, where the right involved is one of personal
liberty, a statutory distinction between persons similarly situated will be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny 36 and will likely be voided.3 7 This same
close examination will be given to classifications which are considered
38
suspect, such as race, in order to negate legislative discrimination.
The question of whether illegitimacy is a suspect class has been
addressed by the Court on a number of occasions; 39 however, the question is not reached by Quilloin.4° Although the Court followed the
Stanley view of the family unit as having the constitutional protection of
a fundamental liberty,41 the Georgia statute's distinction between wed
and unwed fathers survived the scrutiny of the Court through a finding
that, as applied to the appellant, the classifications were not of persons
similarly situated. 42 The appellant had urged that he was indeed similarly
situated to legitimate fathers, particularly those separated or divorced
from the mother of the child. In rejecting this view, the Court noted that
although he was subject to substantially the same support requirements as
a married father, 43 the appellant had never shouldered actual responsibilithe basis for identifying rights which would be afforded the strict scrutiny of the Court
was their relationship to the political processes which could act to abolish discriminatory
classifications; e.g. peaceful assembly and political mechanisms which should be relied
upon to protect minorities. Id. at 152 n.4.
35. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), upholding a statute
limiting the sale of optical appliances to certain persons, as violative of neither due
process nor equal protection.
36. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), which declared
that a poll tax infringed upon a fundamental right and must be closely scrutinized.
37. This process of definitional predestination, with the outcome of the ruling on a

statute's validity turning almost solely on the classification of the right involved, has led to
criticism of the two-tiered analysis of equal protection. See Forum: Equal Protectionand
the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975).
38. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which first noted that
classifications of race by the legislature are suspect, although the classification here was
upheld on the basis of a compelling national interest.
39. For the Court's most recent consideration of, and failure to find, illegitimacy as a
suspect class, see Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977), which struck down an Illinois
inheritance statute which distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children. See
also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40. The court also noted that the appellant had waived the claim that the statutes
make gender-based classifications which violate equal protection. 98 S. Ct. at 554 n.13.
41. Id. at 554-55.

42. Id. at 555.
43. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-105, 74-202 (1973).
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ty for the child nor did he seek custody of the child. On the other hand,
even a divorced father would have borne the responsibility of supporting
his children during the term of his marriage. On this basis, Quilloin held
that the state was not barred by the equal protection clause from making
this distinction based on paternal commitment. 4 Although not specifically stated by the Court, it is clear that the failure of the appellant to meet
the basic requirements of an equal protection challenge was determined
by the interests of the child. The Court in Quilloin gave judicial recognition to the concept that there can be no absolute parental right without
parental responsibility.
As stated at the outset, 45 the finding of Quilloin that this distinction
between wed and unwed fathers is valid limits the balancing of the
fundamental rights of parents and the interest of the state in preserving
the well-being of its children through the maintenance of a stable home
life.' The thrust of the appellant's due process claim was that his
parental authority ought not be undermined absent a forfeiture of that
authority by having his unfitness as a parent duly established. This claim
relied heavily on the rationale of Stanley that unwed fathers do have
protected rights in their illegitimate children. The Quilloin response was
that these rights have reciprocal duties, with the rights of the child
invoking constitutional protection as well. Thus, where the denial of
parental power acted to preserve the child's environment and to protect
the state's interest in the child's welfare from the whims of nonsupporting parents, the requirements of due process were satisfied.47 This same
balancing of the rights of the parent, child, and state resulted in the
Quilloin view that a nonsupporting unwed father is not similarly situated
to legitimate fathers, and defeated a challenge to the law based on equal
protection without reaching the thornier aspects of two-tiered analysis.48
Stanley and Quilloin represent, to some extent, the alternate ends of a
spectrum. The very personal and individual nature of the problem makes
it probable and desirable that the middleground be defined on a case by
case basis with the child's best interest always the focal point of the
solution.
The Court did not deal with the issue of illegitimacy as a suspect
44. 98 S. Ct. at 555.
45. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
46. For the view that any statutory reaction to Stanley which sacrifices efficient
processing of adoptions in an attempt to notify ellusive putative fathers goes beyond the
mandate of the Court, see Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of
ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L. Q. 527 (1975).
47. See notes 20-29 supra and accompanying text.
48. See notes 30-44 supra and accompanying text.
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class49 nor with the potential sex discrimination problems of adoption
statutes such as the Georgia law." These issues were not essential to the
resolution of Quilloin and can well wait other decisions. Despite its
clarification of some of the problems of Stanley, the Quilloin decision
may be faulted for its lack of discussion of analytical factors for equal
protection claims. While it has been suggested by both scholars 5' and the
Court itself52 that the traditional two-tiered analysis of equal protection is
too rigid, the development of other criteria cannot come about absent the
clear articulation of the standards applied and the goals sought in a
-decision such as Quilloin.
Marc Francis Conley
49. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
50. See note 40 supra.
51. For a discussion of the development and trends in equal protection, including

views of problems arising under two-tiered analysis, see Forum: EqualProtectionandthe
Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONT. L. Q. 645 (1975).
52. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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